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In this brief essay, we wish to highlight some insights from behavioural economics
that can contribute to a successful process of international pandemic lawmaking. Our
interest here is not to engage with individual or collective psychological reactions to
pandemics or other large-scale risks, or with substantive policy made in their wake.
Several such behavioural issues and dimensions have been dealt with elsewhere,
not without (ongoing) spirited debate. For example, the utility of simple reminders
to get vaccinated as individual ‘nudges’, contrasting with enforced vaccination is
a continuing issue. Indeed, the WHO is addressing such approaches through the
Technical Advisory Group on Behavioural Insights and Sciences for Health, in
accordance with general UN behavioural science policy. Similarly, elite decision-
makers’ tendencies towards procrastination and omission bias in the face of high
degrees of uncertainty, on both national and international levels have arguably
negatively impacted large-scale policies with respect to Covid-19. Understanding
these and other behavioural dynamics may be crucial in determining the substantive
content of a cooperative pandemic regime. Here, however, while building on
related frameworks of analysis from the field of behavioral economics, as applied to
international law (including nudge theory), our focus is on the process and design of
pandemic international law-making.
Our framework of analysis recognizes that international lawmaking processes,
including treaty negotiation, or formulation of ‘soft law’ (such as unenforceable
decisions and resolutions of international organizations), all involve strategic
interactions between actors – states, international governmental/non-governmental
organizations and individuals (negotiators, elite decision-makers and subjects).
These actors are traditionally assumed to be rationally pursuing self-interest and
utility-maximization on domestic and international planes, often within game-
theoretical frameworks (e.g., here). However, this standard rational choice model
is cast in doubt by experimental and empirical research in behavioural economics,
which demonstrates that the rationality of actors does not necessarily conform to
assumptions and expectations. Decision-makers (and at times also corporate actors,
such as states) possess forms of bounded rationality (as well as bounded willpower
and bounded self-interest), with various psychological biases and heuristics that
may determine their ultimate conduct, not least with respect to public goods. Thus,
as a central issue, when faced with risk and uncertainty, actors weigh differently
losses and gains of an objectively equal quantum, often more concerned with
preventing loss than creating gains (‘Prospect Theory’). Accordingly, framing similar
regulatory measures or legal guidelines as either gains or losses can influence their
effectiveness (see, e.g., in an environmental context here).
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With respect to international pandemic law-making, we generally embrace a recent
key analysis of the diminished effectiveness of the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the International Health Regulations (IHR) throughout the Covid-19
pandemic, according to which the pandemic raised problems of political cooperation
rather than expert coordination, to which the current international legal framework
is ill-suited. Indeed, this analysis (at p. 597) also suggests the possibility that “the
assumption about rationality is misguided”. Combatting pandemics is a collective
action problem with well-known incentive deficits. Although arguably it would have
been (globally) welfare-maximizing to distribute vaccines equally in all countries
in order to prevent variants making vaccines less effective, not even under the
veil of ignorance at the beginning of the pandemic of which countries would be hit
hardest could states agree on a legal framework to combat the pandemic. This
in itself comports with behavioral writing on ‘pro-sociality’ of states, which is very
difficult to separate from national self-interest, and when the stakes are as high as
during a pandemic, conduct will tend towards the latter. Having said that, while one
possible conclusion is that future international pandemic law needs stricter rules
and enforcement mechanisms (which indeed might be the case), we offer some
complementary suggestions.
First, international soft law can be surprisingly useful and effective, despite the
absence of enforcement mechanisms. This can be attributed to both traditional
rational choice explanations and to cognitive effects, such as status quo bias
associated with ‘default rules’, the difficulty to discount soft rules as information, and
anchoring effects associated with legal standards (see here). We thus contend that
non-binding arrangements with explicit rules should be considered, alongside to
or as alternatives to ‘hard’ law, which might be more politically feasible than, e.g.,
an effective pandemic convention. The WHO and its members have, for example,
used soft law successfully in the WHO guidelines on packaging and labelling of
tobacco products (e.g., when the WTO Appellate Body upheld a dispute settlement
Panel’s use of non-binding provisions of the Guidelines as evidence of emerging
tobacco control practices on plain packaging). In the context of pandemics, such an
approach could be perhaps replicated through guidelines on incentives and ‘nudges’
to vaccination, and the participation of non-vaccinated in public life.
Second, either through hard or soft law, there is a strong case to be made in favor
of designing positive ‘rewarding’ mechanisms to encourage cooperation rather (or
as complements) to negative sanctioning against non-compliance. For example,
insofar as expedient sharing of information regarding disease outbreaks is a major
goal of international pandemic law-making, rewarding source states who provide
such timely and accurate information of outbreaks and causes may be more effective
than the weak threat of symbolic punishment, especially because it eliminates
problems of access and verification. Such conditional rewarding for capable and
cooperative states– for example, minimum assurances of international assistance
and access to medical supplies and vaccinations, through institutionalized initiatives
like COVAX– could also address gaps that have clearly emerged during Covid-19
between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries.
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Third, attention should be paid to the ‘ground rules’ for negotiation of particular
disciplines, such as opt-ins\opt-outs (such as with respect to dispute resolution) –
research demonstrates that states will opt-in significantly less frequently than opting-
out; yet this may influence the willingness to commit (reflecting on our previous
points). Similarly, positive\negative listing, where relevant – e.g. with respect to
mechanisms for the adoption of internationally recognized travel advisories may
affect negotiations.
Fourth, again, whether as hard or soft law, the status of international pandemic
regulations and decisions should take into account their position as ‘floor or ceiling’
– either or both. Minimum standards run the risk of being considered as ‘anchors’
to which no further effort is required (perhaps weakening states’ motivation to
take ‘additional measures’ as per Article 43 of the WHO International Health
Regulations). Overly stringent regulation (certain types of lockdowns and restrictions
on international travel or excessive vaccination conduct) can create negative
externalities. For example, national vaccination programs can come at the expense
of global health – thus the application of ‘ceiling’ regulations may be considered.
There are certainly more fine-grained aspects of behavioural economics that can
be very pertinent to both design and content issues of international pandemic
law-making. We hope that negotiators will adopt such approaches in overcoming
obstacles to agreement and promoting such agreement’s effectiveness.
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